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Abstract – Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one
another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at
maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these entities when designing their own
networks. In this paper, we study the game investigating how the rational behaviors of entities
impact the system robustness. We first introduce a mathematical model to quantify the interacting
payoffs among varying entities. Then we study the Nash equilibrium of the game and compare
it with the optimal social welfare. We reveal that the cooperation among different entities can
be reached to maximize the social welfare in continuous game only when the average degree of
each network is constant. Therefore, the huge gap between Nash equilibrium and optimal social
welfare generally exists. The rationality of entities makes the system inherently deficient and even
renders it extremely vulnerable in some cases. We analyze our model for two concrete systems
with continuous strategy space and discrete strategy space, respectively. Furthermore, we uncover
some factors (such as weakening coupled strength of interdependent networks, designing suitable
topology dependency of the system) that help reduce the gap and the system vulnerability.
In interdependent networks, nodes from different net-
works rely on one another. The failure of a node in one
network causes its dependent nodes to also fail, leading
to an iterative cascade of failures. They are, consequently,
much more fragile than independent networks [1–3]. Much
attention has been paid on how interdependency results
in the catastrophic cascade of failures and how to improve
the robustness of such systems [4–9].
The game, especially evolutionary game, on interdepen-
dent networks has been well studied before [10–12]. Some
methods, such as optimizing the interdependence topology
[14] and designing proper cooperative mechanisms [13],
have been proposed to promote the cooperation on inter-
dependent networks. Further relevant research has been
done under the elevated levels of cooperation in interde-
pendent networks more precisely, particularly in relation
to information transfer [15, 16].
However, these studies, mainly based on conventional
networked evolutionary game [17, 18], regarded nodes in
networks as the players of the game and represented the
mutilayer relation between them via interdependent net-
works. So far, little is known about the game among in-
terdependent networks in which the players are networks
themselves. In practice, different networks are typically
designed and operated by varying entities [19–21]. For ex-
ample, the power and communication networks are owned
by different companies in China. Each entity aims at max-
imizing its own payoff when building the network, without
considering the overall system performance. Clearly, there
exists a game during the formation of the interdependent
networks, where a network is taken as a player. Studying
such a game helps understand how the topology of the
practical interdependent networks is formed, and provides
insight into their inherent performance degradation, which
has not been studied yet.
We introduce a mathematical framework based on ran-
dom graph theory and percolation theory [22] for study-
ing this game. The system is composed of n interdepen-
dent networks Ni, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and the dependency
is fixed. After a fraction 1 − pi of nodes being randomly
removed from network Ni, there is an iterative cascade
of failures. We denote the fraction of nodes in the giant
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component of network Ni by P∞,i (when the number of
nodes approaches infinity, it represents the probability of
the existence of the giant component) which is a function
of pj , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let 〈k〉i be the average degree
of network Ni. The payoff of Ni is the difference of the
income Ii and the cost Oi associated with building and
operating the network Ni. Clearly, the income of Ni, de-
noted by Ii(P∞, i), is positively correlated to the ratio of
functional nodes (i.e., the fraction of nodes in mutually
connected giant component P∞,i [1] which is positively
correlated to the robustness of the network) in practice.
As P∞,i is a function of pj, we can regard Ii as a function
of pj. Since it requires extra cost to construct and operate
links, we assume that the cost function Oi increases with
the average degree 〈k〉i.
Because the fraction pi of nodes that remain in the
network Ni after the initial attack is not constant in
the real world and is affected by many factors (such as
weather condition for power network [23]), we suppose
it has a probability distribution with density ψi, that is,
P (pi < α) =
∫ α
0
ψi(x)dx. With this, we can compute the
mathematical expectation E(Ii) of the income Ii. The
payoff Yi of the network Ni is thus:
Yi = E(Ii(P∞,i))−Oi(〈k〉i), (1)
and the payoff Y of the whole system (a.k.a. social wel-
fare) is
Y =
n∑
i=i
Yi. (2)
Note that increasing 〈k〉 may not always improve the so-
cial welfare since both the income and the cost increase
with 〈k〉. In a cooperative system, an optimal 〈k〉 and
the corresponding strategy can be calculated to maximize
the social welfare. To be more comprehensible, we pro-
vide an example of two totally interdependent ER net-
works with the same average degree 〈k〉 [24] and a frac-
tion of 1 − pi nodes randomly being removed from net-
work Ni. According to the one-to-one correspondence
[25], it is equivalent to removing 1 − p (which equals to
1 − p1p2) fraction of nodes from one network. There is
a first order percolation transition with the threshold pc.
It has been shown that the threshold pc = 2.4554/〈k〉 [1].
We assume, for simplicity, that the income I = 0 when
p < pc, and I = 1 when p > pc, and that p, the fraction
of functional nodes in N1 after the initial attack, follows
a uniform distribution. The cost function O is set to be a
linear function with coefficient 0.08. Then, the social wel-
fare Y = (1 − pc) − 0.08〈k〉 = 1 − (2.4554/〈k〉+ 0.08〈k〉).
Clearly, a higher 〈k〉 leads to a higher income as well as
a higher cost. It is easy to compute the social optimum
at 〈k〉 = 5.54 where the optimal social welfare Y = 0.11
[26, 27].(see FIG.1)
Unfortunately, the average degree is typically implicit
in pc and P∞,i, which makes our analysis complicated.
Here, we introduce real variables {qi}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, as
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k
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Fig. 1: (Colour on-line) Y , the social welfare of the system com-
posed from two interdependent ER networks with both average
degree being 〈k〉 is shown as a function of 〈k〉 for cost function
O(〈k〉) = 0.08〈k〉. Here, for simplicity, the distribution of p,
i.e., the fraction of remaining nodes after the attack, is sup-
posed to have a uniform distribution. It can be seen from the
figure that the social welfare is not a monotone function of the
average degree and gets its optimum at 〈k〉 = 5.54.
strategy profiles to quantify the construction pattern of
network Ni by the entity i. We suppose that the strategy
set of entity i is Qi, i.e., the range of variable qi, and
Q = Q1 × · · · × Qn is the set of strategy profiles in this
game. Let q−i be the strategy profile of all entities except
for player i. According to [28], the degree distribution of a
node in network Ni can be characterized by Pi(k, qi). For
instance, qi could be the average degree of an ER network
decided by entity i. We introduce the generating function
of network Ni whose arguments are x and qi as
Gi(x, qi) =
∞∑
k=0
Pi(k, qi)x
k. (3)
Different from previous studies [28] [29], the strategy pa-
rameters qi are included in the generating function to as-
sist the analysis of the game. The average degree 〈k〉i of
network Ni can be calculated as
〈k〉i =
∂
∂x
Gi(1, qi) =
∞∑
k=0
kPi(k, qi), (4)
which is a continuous function of qi. Analogously, we in-
troduce the generating function of the underlying branch-
ing process [2]
Hi(x, qi) =
G′i(x, qi)
G′i(1, qi)
, (5)
where G′i(x, qi) is the derivative of G with respect to x.
The probability that a randomly chosen surviving node
belongs to the giant component [1, 7] is given by
gi(p, qi) = 1−Gi[pfi(p, qi) + 1− p, qi], (6)
where fi satisfies
fi(p, qi) = Hi[pfi(p, qi) + 1− p, qi]. (7)
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Similar to Kirchhoff equations, for fixed qi, we can arrive
at a system of iterative equations of unknowns xi and yij
[2] [30]
xi = pi
n∏
j=1
[rjiyjigj(xj)− rji + 1] (8)
yij =
xi
rjiyjigj(xj)− rji + 1
, (9)
where rji ≥ 0 is the fraction of the nodes in network Ni
that directly depends on nodes of network Nj and rii = 0,
xi represents the fraction of the nodes that survive in net-
work Ni after removing all the nodes affected by the ini-
tial attack and the nodes depending on the failed nodes in
other networks, yij is the fraction of the survived nodes in
network Ni after the damage from all the networks con-
nected to network Ni except the network Nj . We can
analytically compute that the fraction P∞,k = xkgk(xk)
of nodes in the giant component of network Nk as a func-
tion of pi and qi. Specially, if n = 2, equation (9) yields
y12 = p1, y21 = p2. Equations (8) can be simplified as:
x1 = p1(r21p2g2(x2)− r21 + 1) (10)
x2 = p2(r12p1g1(x1)− r12 + 1). (11)
If the process of cascade is a first order percolation tran-
sition, there is a single step discontinuity at the threshold
pc, which is also a function of qi [5]; otherwise, we let
pc = 0. According to equation (1), we calculate the ex-
pectation of network Ni’s payoff Yi by equation (12).
From (2), we can compute the social welfare Y =∑n
i=1 Yi of the whole system. When each entity i chooses
strategy qi, the payoff of entity i is denoted by Yi(q) and
the payoff of the system is denoted by Y (q).
Before presenting our main results, we give the following
definitions. A strategy profile q∗ ∈ Q achieves optimal
social welfare if
∀q ∈ Q; Y (q∗) ≥ Y (q). (13)
A strategy profile q∗ ∈ Q is a Nash equilibrium if
∀i, qi ∈ Qi; Yi(q
∗
i , q
∗
−i) ≥ Yi(qi, q−i). (14)
In our model, when the average degree is fixed, we can
get that Oi(〈k〉i) is unchanged about qi, this is a positive-
sum game. In equations (8) and (9), gi are strict increasing
functions on [0, 1]. We can prove that all P∞,i are posi-
tively correlated in interdependent networks. Since all Oi
are fixed, according to equation (12), Yi are positively cor-
related too. This indicates that it will not reduce other
entities’ payoffs when one entity changes his strategy pro-
file to improve his own payoff. It is easy to see, that at
Nash equilibrium the system reaches the optimal social
welfare. Therefore, in such a scenario, the individual pay-
off of each entity is maximized at the same point as the
optimal social welfare. The cooperation among different
networks can be reached.
For example, for the game among interdependent scale-
free (SF) networks whose strategy space is the power of
degree distribution, a higher power leads to an improve-
ment of the system’s robustness [1]. Due to the above
conclusion, when the average degree is fixed, different net-
works can cooperate to improve the power of distribution
as high as possible and reach the optimal social welfare.
However, if each Oi is not fixed, the cooperation among
different networks may be unattainable. In fact, we will
prove in the following that the cooperation is unreachable
if the real variables qi can range in some interval continu-
ously (that is, this is a continuous game). Without loss of
generality, we can assume that the payoff functions are dif-
ferential. Then the necessary condition for a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium is ∂Yi/∂qi = 0. The necessary condition
for the optimal social welfare in this game is ∂Y /∂qi = 0.
We proceed to analyze the game when the average de-
gree can be adjusted by qi of each network Ni. When the
payoff of this system achieves its Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
Yi = Y
max
i , we have ∂Yi/∂qi = 0. According to equation
(1), we have
∂Yi
∂qi
=
∂E(Ii(P∞,i))
∂qi
−
∂Oi(〈k〉i)
∂qi
= 0. (15)
Note that 〈k〉i does not rely on qj if j 6= i, leading to
∂Oi/∂qj = 0. At the Nash equilibrium, we have
∂Y
∂qj
=
n∑
i=1
∂E(Ii(P∞,i))
∂qj
−
n∑
i=1
∂Oi(〈k〉i)
∂qj
=
∑
i6=j
∂E(Ii(P∞,i)))
∂qj
. (16)
Since 〈k〉i is not fixed about qi, ∂E(Ii(P∞,i))/∂qi =
∂Oi(〈k〉i)/∂qi 6= 0. Due to the interdependency,
the incomes of n networks, which are decided by
the robustness of the system, are positively correlated.
∂E(Ii(P∞,i)))/∂qj have the same sign and do not equal
to 0, leading to ∂Y /∂qj 6= 0. Therefore, Nash equilibrium
(since the concrete payoff function is not given here, the
pure strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist, however,
our model can be easily extended to the mixed strat-
egy game in which Nash equilibrium always exists [26])
deviates from the optimal social welfare. The coopera-
tion among different interdependent networks can not be
reached. The rationality of different entities makes the
system inherently deficient.
If Yi = Y
max
i is the payoff Yi of network Ni at the Nash
equilibrium and Y = Ymax at the social optimum, we de-
fine ∆ as
∆ =
Y max1 + Y
max
2
Ymax
≤ 1 (17)
to evaluate this game. The higher ∆ is, the closer the
payoffs at Nash equilibrium and social optimum are.
Next we analyze our model for concrete interdepen-
dent networks and strategy space. For the convenience
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Yi =
∫ 1
pc
. . .
∫ 1
pc
Ii(P∞,i(qi, . . . , qn, p1, . . . , pn))
n∏
j=1
ψj(pj)dp1 . . . dpn −Oi(〈k〉i). (12)
q1
(Y1, Y2) q2
5 6 7 8 9 10
5 (0.340,0.340) (0.356,0.340) (0.367,0.351) (0.374,0.350) (0.379,0.347) (0.383,0.343)
6 (0.340,0.356) (0.366,0.366) (0.376,0.368) (0.383,0.367) (0.388,0.364) (0.392,0.360)
7 (0.351,0.367) (0.368,0.376) (0.379,0.379) (0.386,0.378) (0.391,0.375) (0.395,0.371)
8 (0.350,0.374) (0.367,0.383) (0.378,0.386) (0.385,0.385) (0.390,0.382) (0.394,0.378)
9 (0.347,0.379) (0.364,0.388) (0.375,0.391) (0.382,0.390) (0.387,0.387) (0.391,0.383)
10 (0.343,0.383) (0.360,0.392) (0.395,0.371) (0.378,0.394) (0.383,0.391) (0.386,0.386)
Table 1: Game Matrix for two totally interdependent RR networks: the two components of the vectors in matrix are the payoffs
of two entities with corresponding strategy profile for Ii(x) = x and Oi(x) = 0.008x. The Nash equilibrium and optimal social
welfare are underlined in the matrix. It can be seen that there is a notable gap between the Nash equilibrium q1 = q2 = 7 and
social optimum q1 = q2 = 9.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: (Colour on-line) For two totally coupled ER net-
works whose strategy space is the set of their average de-
grees {〈k〉1, 〈k〉2}, the payoff Y1 (figure (a)) and Y2 (figure (b))
are shown as functions of 〈k〉1 and 〈k〉2 with Ii(x) = x and
Oi(x) = 0.05x. By numerical simulations, we get that this
game reaches its social optimum at 〈k〉1 = 〈k〉2 = 4.37 with
Y = 0.54 and reaches its Nash equilibrium at 〈k〉1 = 〈k〉2=3.09
with Y=0.49. We can see that there is a notable gap between
Nash equilibrium and social optimum.
of our numerical validation but without loss of general-
ity, we set Ii and Oi to be linear functions in the fol-
lowing experiments. For coupled Random Regular (RR)
networks, we set qi ∈ Z
+ to be their average degree 〈k〉i
(i ∈ {1, 2}). Then we have Gi(x, qi) = x
qi , Hi = x
qi−1
and P∞,i = xigi(xi) where gi are given in equation (6).
Set Ii(x) = x and Oi(x) = 0.008x in equation (1) and
the distributions of p1 and p2 to be uniform distributions.
Since the average degree of RR network can only be inte-
ger, the game between two interdependent RR networks is
discrete. By numerical validation, we have the payoff ma-
trix and obtain the Nash equilibrium and social optimum
of this discrete game. TABLE.1 is the game matrix for
the case where two networks are totally interdependent,
i.e., r12 = r21 = 1 in equations (10) and (11). From this
matrix, we can calculate that q1 = q2 = 9 are the strategy
in the social optimum and q1 = q2 = 7 are those in the
Nash equilibrium. Similarly, we can get the Nash equilib-
rium and social optimum for partially interdependent RR
networks.
For two coupled ER networks, we set qi to be their av-
erage degree 〈k〉i (i ∈ {1, 2}). Then we have Gi(x, qi) =
Hi(x, qi) = exp[qi(x − 1)]. Similarly to the first example,
we set Ii and Oi to be linear functions whose coefficients
are 1 and 0.05, respectively. We also set the distributions
of pi to be uniform. As FIG.2 shows, we can solve Y1 and
Y2 as functions of q1 and q2. By numerical simulations, we
can obtain the Nash equilibrium and social optimum for
this game. For instance, in the case of two totally coupled
ER networks, we get that this system reaches its social
optimum at 〈k〉1 = 〈k〉2=4.37 with Y=0.54 and reaches
its Nash equilibrium at 〈k〉1 = 〈k〉2=3.09 with Y=0.49.
Set r12 = r21 = r ≤ 1 in equations (10) and (11), we
evaluate our model for interdependent networks with dif-
ferent coupled strength (i.e., with different r) and differ-
ent Ii and Oi. As FIG.3 shows, we have that reducing the
coupled strength of interdependent networks leads to an
improvement of Ymax, Y
max
1 + Y
max
2 and ∆. It is worth
mentioning that, since the game between two interdepen-
dent RR networks is discrete, the Nash equilibrium, which
only can be integer, does not change continuously about
r and has discontinuity. Thus the Y max1 + Y
max
2 and ∆
are not strictly decreasing about r (as the subfigure of
FIG.3(a) shows). However, in general, the system is more
profitable and efficient as a result of reducing the coupled
strength.
From the above examples of RR networks and ER net-
works, we can see that the rational behaviors will make
the system away from the optimal robustness and render
it more vulnerable in some cases. As FIG.4 shows, we
get the P∞ − p graph at the Nash equilibrium and so-
cial optimum for r = 1 and r = 0.6, respectively. The
threshold is higher and P∞ is lower at Nash equilibrium
in the same scenario. Note that the system of interdepen-
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Fig. 3: (Colour on-line) For two coupled RR and ER net-
works whose strategy spaces are average degree, Y max1 +Y
max
2 ,
Ymax and ∆ are shown as functions of coupled strength r with
Ii(x) = x, Oi(x) = cx and the distribution of pi(i ∈ {1, 2}) be-
ing uniform distribution. Figure (a) and figure (c) are Ymax−r,
(Y max1 +Y
max
2 )− r and ∆− r graphs for coupled RR networks
with c = 0.014 and c = 0.008, respectively. Figure (b) and
figure (d) are Ymax − r, (Y
max
1 + Y
max
2 ) − r and ∆ − r graphs
for coupled ER networks with c = 0.05 and c = 0.03, respec-
tively. Red square, red circle, blue square and blue circle curves
correspond to Y max1 + Y
max
2 at c = 0.014, Ymax at c = 0.014,
Y max1 + Y
max
2 at c = 0.008, Ymax at c = 0.008 in figure (a),
and correspond to Y max1 + Y
max
2 at c = 0.05, Ymax at c = 0.05,
Y max1 + Y
max
2 at c = 0.03, Ymax at c = 0.03 in figure (b). Red
circle and blue square curves correspond to ∆ at c = 0.014 and
c = 0.008 in figure (c), and correspond to ∆ at c = 0.05 and
c = 0.03 in figure (d). It can be seen from the subfigure of fig-
ure (a) that Y max1 +Y
max
2 is not strictly decreasing in r. We can
see that reducing the coupled strength leads to a remarkable
improvement of Ymax, Y
max
1 + Y
max
2 and ∆.
dent networks is more vulnerable at Nash equilibrium as
a result of rationality.
It is important to find a way of reducing gap between
optimal social welfare and Nash equilibrium for the game
among interdependent networks. Besides reducing cou-
pled strength, surprisingly, we find that the gap is nar-
rower for the system with suitable dependency topology.
Here we test our model for two systems composed of five
interdependent networks with different dependency topol-
ogy. Let all coupled networks be totally interdependent.
According to the one-to-one correspondence, randomly re-
moving 1 − pi fractions of nodes from each network Ni is
equivalent to a single attack on one of the networks which
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
p1
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P
∞
(a)RR
(a)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
p1
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P
∞
(b)ER
(b)
Fig. 4: (Colour on-line) P∞-p graph, of two coupled RR net-
works and ER networks at Nash equilibrium and social op-
timum with Ii = x, Oi = 0.008x for figure (a), Ii = x,
Oi = 0.05x for figure (b) and r = 0.6, r = 1 respectively. P∞,
the fraction of nodes in the giant component of network N1,
is shown as a function of the fraction p1 of remaining nodes
in N1. Squire, star, circle and triangle curves correspond to
Nash equilibrium at r = 0.6, social optimum at r = 0.6, Nash
equilibrium at r = 1 and social optimum at r = 1, respectively.
We can see that the threshold of percolation transition is higher
and P∞ is lower at Nash equilibrium in the same scenario, and
that the system is more vulnerable at Nash equilibrium than
those at social optimum.
removes 1 − p = 1 −
∏5
i=1 pi fraction of nodes. Set the
distribution of p to be uniform and Ii and Oi be linear
functions with coefficients 1 and 3.5 × 10−4 in equations
(1) for RR networks and coefficients 1 and 2.5× 10−4 for
ER networks. We validate the cases of chain-like and
star-like system formed from five networks (See FIG.5).
By numerical simulations, we obtain that the star-like oli-
garchic dependency topology tends to reduce the gap (See
TABLE.2).
Summarizing, in this paper, we study the influence of
rational behavior on system robustness. We reveal that, in
the continuous game, the cooperation among different in-
terdependent networks is reachable only when the average
degree of each network is fixed in strategy space. While in
general, there is a huge gap between the Nash equilibrium
and optimal social welfare as a result of rationality which
makes the system inherent deficient. We reveal and vali-
date some factors (including weakening coupled strength
of interdependent networks and designing suitable topol-
ogy dependency of system) that help reduce the gap and
deficiency.
Interdependent networks exist in all aspects of our life,
nature and technology. The game among interdependent
networks is more complicated in real world since besides
the fraction of giant component and average degree, the
utility function may rely on many factors and need further
investigation. It is of great importance to find other effi-
cient ways of reducing the system’s vulnerability and the
gap between Nash equilibrium and optimal social welfare.
p-5
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RR star-like chain-like ER star-like chain-like
∆ 1.0 0.89 ∆ 0.56 0.52
Table 2: ∆ is shown for five interdependent RR networks and
ER networks with different dependency topology. We can see
that the ∆ is higher for star-like system comparing to chain-like
system.
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